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I. INTRODUCTION

The fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education'
certainly warrants well-deserved celebration, but not one that deflects
careful analysis of its legacy. Brown's legacy and what it says about
the efficacy of litigation as a vehicle to achieve social change mean
different things to different people. Perspectives on what Brown
"means" and what it has accomplished vary tremendously and reveal
just as much about ourselves as they do about the decision itself.2
This ambiguity invariably muddles Brown's legacy.
I argue that Brown's legacy does not bode well for future
litigation efforts seeking to enhance the equal educational opportunity
doctrine, principally due to how the doctrine has evolved during the
past fifty years. Even if one concludes that Brown succeeded in the
school desegregation context (itself a contested point), the nature of
equal educational opportunity contests has changed over the decades
in ways that make them even less amenable to litigation. Unlike past
efforts, emerging litigation focuses more directly on student academic
achievement rather than on race or school funding.
Academic
achievement implicates teaching and learning activities - activities
located deeper inside schools and classrooms, and consequently,
further from litigation's reach. If past education reformers and
litigants found it difficult to influence such factors as school
demographic profiles and funding levels, litigation efforts seeking to
influence student achievement will likely encounter even greater
difficulty. Furthermore, this substantive legal area's insulation from
even successful litigation underscores its inherent complexity, the
salience of nonlegal components and, more generally, the structural
limitations of law and litigation as tools to achieve desired social
change.

1.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2.
Professor Balkin describes the Brown opinion as a quasi-Rorschach test for legal
scholars. Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD
HAVE SAID 3, 8 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2002).
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Any understanding of Brown's implications for current and
future education litigation requires a clear understanding of Brown's
past accomplishments. In Brown, the Court placed the finishing
touches on a multidecade legal assault designed to render the
3
infamous "separate-but-equal" doctrine from Plessy v. Ferguson
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Brown
opinion did not expressly overrule Plessy as a formal matter, few
doubted 4 that Brown implicitly did so. 5 Although much of the heavy
legal lifting took place prior to 1954, the Court in Brown preempted
any further torturing of the Plessy doctrine's application by concluding
' 6
that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Popular mythology emphasizes Brown's critical role in securing
equal educational opportunity for all students. Critical reflection,
however, reveals that the decision's legacy is anything but clear. A
narrow slice of the equal educational opportunity doctrine-one
focusing on school desegregation-suggests Brown's legacy in this
context is aptly characterized as one of unfulfilled promise. School
desegregation data reveal a picture that is far from pretty, further
complicating Brown's legacy, and serving as yet another reminder of
the limits of well-intentioned efforts to improve educational practice,
policy, and results through litigation.
An equally plausible alternative perspective on the equal
educational opportunity doctrine includes the school finance litigation
This broader perspective, while also admittedly
movement.
incomplete, possesses the virtue of reflecting the expanse of the
terrain that the Brown decision occupies. This broader view casts a
more positive light on Brown's legacy as school finance litigation
illustrates the Brown decision's enduring influence on the equal
educational opportunity doctrine. Although experiencing many of the
same difficulties the Brown decision encountered in the segregation
context, school finance litigation also evidences the Brown decision's
flexibility and ability to evolve over time.
Of perhaps greater import is how Brown and its legacy might
inform future litigation efforts seeking education reform. Although
education litigation theories have evolved over time, the equal
educational opportunity doctrine has evolved dramatically over these
3.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare
4.
Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2036 n.22 (1996) (declaring that Brown is now "universally seen" as
overruling Plessy).
5.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 ("Any language in Plessy v.Ferguson contrary to this finding
is rejected.").
6.
Id. at 495.
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same years. Unlike past and present reform efforts focusing on race
and finance, future efforts will engage more directly with student
academic achievement.
Lingering achievement gaps separate
students by race and ethnicity and pose an important threat to the
promise of equal educational opportunity. 7
Student academic
achievement involves a host of complicated and interacting variables,
including teaching and learning, as well as school and non-school
relations critical to the learning process.8 These variables reside deep
inside schools and classrooms and, as such, reside further away from
the reach of litigation and court decisions. The resilience of such
variables to successful litigation underscores their underlying
complexity, nonlegal components, and, more generally, the structural
limitations of law and litigation as tools to achieve desired policy
goals. Addressing student achievement challenges will likely place at
least as much of a premium on collaboration as on adversarial
litigation. 9 If my central claims are correct, future education reform
litigation will require manifestly greater effort, and greater effort
alone will not ensure success.
Although the efficacy of litigation efforts seeking to enhance
student academic achievement is unclear, at best, what is abundantly
clear-indeed, painfully obvious to all-is that far too many schools
fail to educate far too many children. Worse still, such failure is
hauntingly easy to predict. As Professor Howard Gardner notes:
Tell me the ZIP code of a child and I will predict her chances of college completion and
probable income; add the elements of family support (parental, grandparental, ethnic
and religious values) and few degrees of freedom remain, at least in our country. 10

The empirically demonstrable correlations Professor Gardner
describes-correlations easily replicated by most competent secondyear graduate students-drive a stake through American education's
"Holy Grail" and what I take to be central to Brown's ideal. Although
reasonable minds can and surely do differ about what equal education

7.

See DIANE RAVITCH, NATIONAL STANDARDS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 72 (1995) (noting

that the racial and ethnic achievement gap "has narrowed, but it remains large").
8.

See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 21-23 (1966)

(studying student achievement and finding stronger correlation between student achievement
and nonschool factors than between achievement and school factors) [hereinafter COLEMAN
REPORT].

9.
See Harold Howe II, Forewordto LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM, at vii-x (Jay P. Heubert ed.,
1999) [hereinafter LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM] (noting that lawyers are better known for
litigating than for collaborating); see also Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools,
Communities, and the Courts: A DialogicApproach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POLY
REV. 99, 114-36 (1996) (proposing a deliberative engagement among a wide array of school
finance stakeholders).
10. Howard Gardner, Paroxysms of Choice, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 19, 2000, at 44, 49.
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means in any particular context, fair and reasonable minds converge
on the proposition that if the doctrine means anything, at the very
least, it must mean that ZIP codes should not predict a child's
educational destiny. Nor should the influence of ZIP codes crowd out
the influence of more palatable variables, including talent, effort, and
drive. This is part of the larger set of problems that Brown sought to
fix. This challenge persists after fifty years, despite Brown's shining
achievement and fifty years of litigation.
It is important to
understand why.
My analysis includes three main parts. Part II focuses on the
effort launched by Brown to desegregate America's public schools. I
consider what the decision achieved, what it did not fully achieve, and
what factors help explain why the decision delivered something less
than it sought. Part III examines how school finance litigation took
up where desegregation efforts left off. A brief review of the education
litigation terrain covered during the past fifty years reveals two broad
themes considered in Part IV.
First, the equal educational
opportunity doctrine now focuses on outcomes rather than such inputs
as race and resources. Second, student academic achievement is the
salient outcome and, as such, thrusts education litigants deeper into
the education enterprise. Consequently, if litigants found the effort to
desegregate difficult, emerging efforts will encounter even greater
difficulties. In a concluding section, I argue that education reform is
unlikely absent greater coordination among the legal and relevant
social, economic, and political institutions.
II. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
Although the Brown decision has always been about more than
school desegregation, it has, at the same time, always been at least
about school desegregation. Any assessment of Brown's legacy needs
to account for the decision's impact on the integration of public
schools.
Although Brown succeeded in eliminating de jure
segregation, it fell short of eliminating de facto segregation.
A. De Jure School Segregation:Full Circles
By eliminating formal, state-sponsored segregated schools,
Brown manifestly succeeded on one critical level. Despite welldocumented resistance, it is clear that de jure school segregation no
longer exists. Brown rendered state-enforced "whites only" public
schools to little more than a painful relic of American history.
Although Brown did not expressly overrule Plessy's odious "separate-
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but-equal" doctrine, the decision was well understood to mean that
racially separate education facilities were not permitted under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1'
It is difficult to overstate the Brown decision's significance.
13
The decision has been described as "cataclysmic"'12 and "canonical."'
Brown is easily one of the most important legal decisions in the second
half of the twentieth century, if not the most important.
One
commentator went even further when he described Brown as
"assuredly the most important litigation of any kind ... since the Civil
War."'14 Aside from a single handful of other cases, Roe v. Wade, 15
Miranda v. Arizona,' 6 and Marbury v. Madison 7 among them, few
legal decisions penetrate more deeply into the nation's collective
conscious and reveal more about one's thoughts about the courts'
proper role in our constitutional structure than Brown.'8 Professor
Balkin notes that no theory of constitutional law is deemed acceptable
unless it can "explain and justify" the result reached in Brown. 19
Similarly, "[n]o federal judicial nominee and no mainstream national
politician today would dare suggest that Brown was wrongly
20
decided."
Brown's clarity on the unconstitutionality of racially separate
school facilities, however, was insufficient to deflect modern
contemplation regarding public schools that were restricted to AfricanAmerican students. 21
Analogous reform efforts promoting sexexclusive public schools remain the subject of continued and, indeed,
growing public and scholarly debate. 22 While race-exclusive policy
11.

See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.

12.

ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW 3 (1986).

13. Balkin, supra note 2, at 12.
14. Louis H. Pollak, Thurgood Marshall: Lawyer and Justice, 40 MD. L. REV. 405, 406
(1981).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-66 (finding blanket statutory prohibitions of abortion
unconstitutional); Miranda,384 U.S. at 467-74 (requiring warning upon arrest and questioning);
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179-80 (articulating power of judicial review). It remains
conceivable that the relatively recent decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), might warrant
inclusion on this list. At this early juncture, however, not enough time has passed to assess its
significance accurately.
19. Jack M. Balkin, Preface to WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID
supra note 2, at ix, x-xi.
20. Balkin, supra note 2, at 4.
21.

For a general discussion, see ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL:

RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING (2003).

See also Michael Heise, Are Single-Sex Schools

Inherently Unequal?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1219 (forthcoming 2004) (reviewing SALOMONE, supra).

22.

See, e.g., supra note 21.
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initiatives have not withstood legal challenge, 23 that such policies are
even contemplated evidences just how far American society has
traveled these past fifty years. 24 That the Brown opinion was used by
both sides of the debate over publicly-funded African-American-only
schools further evidences the decision's rich texture and malleable
25
quality.
That public discussion of racially exclusive public schools
surfaced at all, let alone within five decades of the Brown decision,
reflects growing frustration with some sectors of public education,
especially urban public schools, many of which serve a
disproportionate number of students from low-income households.
One source of the growing frustration is clear. Low-poverty schools
almost always outperform high-poverty urban schools.
Students
attending low-poverty schools typically score 50 to 75 percent higher
26
on reading and math tests than do students in high-poverty schools.
27
Similar evidence supporting this conclusion abounds.
Low student achievement is only one of the ills that plague
numerous urban districts. Dropout rates in high-poverty schools
usually exceed rates in low-poverty schools. 28 Problems also persist
for those students who remain in these high-poverty, urban
institutions. Urban public school teachers report spending more time
on classroom discipline than their nonurban counterparts, 29 as well as
3
having more problems relating to student absenteeism, 30 pregnancy, '
23. See generally Garrett v. Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006-08 (E.D. Mich.
1991) (finding that Detroit's publicly-funded exclusively African-American male academies
violated the Equal Protection Clause on gender grounds).
24. Not surprisingly, proposals for race-exclusive schools attract severe attention and,
frequently, harsh criticism. Compare Christopher Steskal, Note, Creating Space for Racial
Difference: The Case for African-American Schools, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 189 (1992)
(arguing that the Constitution can accommodate all-black public schools), with Richard
Cummings, All-Male Black Schools: Equal Protection, the New Separatism and Brown v. Board
of Education, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725, 726 (1993) (arguing that black male-only schools are
unconstitutional).
25. Compare Cummings, supra note 24, at 726 (invoking the Brown decision against blackonly public schools), with Roberta L. Steele, Note, All Things Not Being Equal: The Case for Race
Separate Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 591, 602-08 (1993) (invoking the Brown decision in
support of black-only public schools).
26. MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PROSPECTS: THE CONGRESSIONALLY
MANDATED STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY: INTERIM REPORT 18 (1993).
27. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON
STUDENT OUTCOMES 73 (1997).
28. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS
THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 54 (2001).
29. LAURA LIPPMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., URBAN SCHOOLS: THE CHALLENGE OF
LOCATION AND POVERTY 116 fig.4.44 (1996).

30.
31.

Id. at 114 figs.4.41-4.42.
Id. at 124 figs.4.56-4.57.
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and weapons possession. 32 Finally, those students who manage to
graduate from high-poverty urban schools are less likely to attend
college than those who graduate from low-poverty schools. 33 Thus,
whatever one may think about the substantive policy merits of, for
example, the Detroit School Board's proposal to establish all-AfricanAmerican (and all-male) schools, 34 it is difficult to quarrel with the
sentiment that an education disaster had arrived in Detroit and that
drastic steps were warranted.3 5 The very fact that predominately
minority districts such as Detroit 36 contemplated such options that, on
a conceptual level, turn the Brown decision on its head underscores
the magnitude of the problems these school districts confront.
B. De Facto School Segregation: What Brown Did Not Fully Achieve
The Court's successful defeat of de jure school segregation did
not translate into a defeat of de facto segregation. Given the decision's
initial reception throughout parts of the nation, this result does not
surprise.
As one commentator noted: "The statistics from the
Southern states are truly amazing. For ten years, 1954-64, virtually
nothing happened."37 That is to say, many school districts-especially
those in the South-simply ignored the mandate of one of the
Supreme Court's most important rulings of the twentieth century.
Current national public school enrollment data are telling.
Despite the absence of dejure segregation, most African-American and
Hispanic students attend urban schools that predominately consist of
minorities. In 1996-97, for example, nearly 70 percent of AfricanAmerican and nearly 75 percent of Hispanic students attended schools
that were between 50 percent and 100 percent minority. 38 More than
one-third of African-American and Hispanic students attend schools

32. Id. at 120 figs.4.50-4.51.
33. KAHLENBERG, supra note 28, at 54 ("Few students graduating from high-poverty high
schools are likely to be going on to college: just 15 percent of inner-city graduates do.").
34. See supra note 24 (citing sources detailing constitutional and policy-based arguments
regarding Detroit's African-American male academy).
35. See SALOMONE, supra note 21, at 129-32 and text accompanying note 21.
36. See infra Table 1.
37.

GERALD

N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? 52 (1991) (emphasis in original); see also Richard T. Ford, Brown's Ghost, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1305, 1305-06 (2004) (noting that "Brown did not accomplish what many people had hoped
and believed that it would-integration-in the area that the case directly addressed: public
primary education.").
38.

GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV.,

RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS
14 tbl.9 (1999), available at http://www
.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/resegregationAmericanschools99.pdf.
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that are almost exclusively (over 90 percent) minority. 39 In contrast,
during the same period, the overwhelming majority of white students
attended schools that were predominately white. Indeed, the average
40
white student attends a school that is 81.2 percent Caucasian.
Notwithstanding the Brown decision and five decades of Browninspired litigation, "there has not been a single year in American
history in which at least half of the nation's black children attended
41
schools that were largely white."
1. Urban Public School Districts
A shift in focus from national statistics to data on the nation's
largest school districts helps bring the racial and ethnic segregation
intensity into focus. As Table 1 illustrates, all but one (Hillsborough
County, Florida) of the nation's largest school districts are mostly
minority, and many overwhelmingly so. If anything, Table 1 fails to
capture the full intensity of racial isolation in certain districts. As of
1995, all of the students in East St. Louis, Illinois, and in Compton,
California, were minority. 42 Close to all-between 93 percent and 96
percent-of the students in Washington, D.C., Hartford, New Orleans,
San Antonio, Camden, Los Angeles, Oakland, and Atlanta were
minority. 43 In Richmond, Virginia, and Newark, New Jersey, over 90
percent of the students were minority. 44 In Detroit, almost 95 percent
of the students were minority. 45 In New York City, the nation's
largest public school district, meanwhile, over 83 percent of the more
46
than one million students served are minority.
Table 1 also illustrates another key-yet subtle-development.
In every instance the proportion of white, non-Hispanic individuals
residing in these large cities exceeds, in some districts by more than
100 percent, the proportion of white, non-Hispanic students attending
public schools. This suggests that not only do white families pursue
education options by departing urban areas when their children reach
school age (or avoid living in cities to begin with), but that those white
families living in the nation's largest areas avail themselves of private
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 15 tbl.l.

41.

PETER IRONS, JIM CROW'S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN DECISION

338 (2002).
42. Craig D. Jerald & Bridget K. Curran, By the Numbers: The Urban Picture, EDUC. WK.,
Jan. 8, 1998, at 56.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. ORFIELD & YUN, supranote 38, at 9 tbl.4.
46. Jerald & Curran, supra note 42, at 56.
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school options at a rate that greatly exceeds their non-white
counterparts. White families' mobility-both in terms of departing
urban for non-urban areas and exiting public for private schoolsfuels a disproportionate absence of white schoolchildren in urban
public schools and contributes to levels of racial isolation in urban
districts that exceed what general residential integration levels
predict. Although numerous reasons help explain the migration of
white families with school-age children from urban to non-urban areas
(and some reasons remain disputed), many point to forced and
voluntary desegregation efforts as a contributing factor. 47

47.

E.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 113

(1995).
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DISTRICT RESIDENTIAL POPULATION 48 AND TOTAL

PUBLIC SCHOOL ENROLLMENT, 49 BY RACE AND ETHNICITY IN NATION'S
LARGEST SCHOOL DISTRICTS 50 (PERCENT)
Residential

School District

White, non-

White, non-

Hispanic

Hispanic

New York City

35.0

15.3

Los Angeles

29.7

9.9

Chicago

31.3

9.6

Dade Cty, FL

41.3

11.3

Broward Cty, FL

58.0

41.2

Clark Cty, NV

60.2

49.9

Houston

30.8

10.0

Philadelphia

42.5

16.7

Hillsborough Cty, FL

63.3

51.8

Detroit

10.5

3.7

Other implications flow from the persistence of raciallyidentifiable public schools. Concentrated poverty usually accompanies
the racial and ethnic isolation of minorities. Indeed, the correlation
between race and poverty, at least in the education context, 5 1 is
48. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SUMMARY FILE 1, MATRICES P3, P4, available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/sumfilel.html.
Beginning with the 2000 census, respondents were permitted to select more than one ethnicity or
race, or they could write in their own racial description. To account for the possibility for doublecounting, I present racial and ethnic data in terms of either "White, non-Hispanic" or "all other."
To derive the percentage of white, non-Hispanic residents I divided the total number of single
race, white-only non-Hispanics by the total population. The resulting percentage captures those
individuals who described themselves as only white and non-Hispanic. Minimizing doublecounting comes at the cost of a loss of greater racial specificity. Insofar as school desegregation
has traditionally been construed in terms of white and non-white students, such a cost, though
regrettable, is reasonable. For a description of problems that now confront demographers and
researchers, see, for example, Tamar Jacoby, An End to Counting Race?, 111 COMMENTARY 6
(June 2001) (describing the changes to census policy); Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American
Voting Rights and Representation: A Perspectivefrom the Northeast, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 739,
748 n.69 (2001) (arguing that the Census Bureau's new policy on racial and ethnic identification
will complicate enforcement of voting rights); Mireya Navarro, Going Beyond Black and White,
Hispanics in Census Pick 'Other,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at Al (noting how Hispanic
respondents react to the new census options regarding race and ethnicity).
49. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., COMMON CORE OF DATA, public
school district data for the 2000-01 school year, availableat http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/schoolsearch/.
50. Due to an array of anomalies, the list of the largest school districts excludes two
districts-Puerto Rico and Hawaii.
51. For purposes of this discussion, I define poor students as those eligible for the federal
reduced-lunch program.
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startling. Conversely, a larger percentage of white students will
typically guarantee a school a smaller percentage of poor students.
These trends interact in devastating ways. Less than 10 percent of
schools whose enrollments are between 10 percent and 20 percent
minority are predominately poor. 52 Exactly half of the schools that are
50 percent to 60 percent minority are predominately poor. 53 And
nearly 90 percent of schools that are 90 percent to 100 percent
minority are predominately poor. 54 If we narrow our focus further and
look at specific urban districts, the extent of poverty becomes even
clearer. Over two-thirds of the students in Atlanta, New York City,
New Orleans, Los Angeles, Chicago, St. Louis, Camden, Jersey City,
Newark, and Bridgeport, are poor. 55 So, too, are nearly two-thirds of
the students in Oakland, Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Detroit,
56
Kansas City (Missouri), Buffalo, and Dallas.
2. Increasingly Unstable 'Successfully' Integrated Public School
Districts
Taken in isolation, Table 1 risks unduly diminishing school
desegregation progress-progress clearly indebted to the Brown
decision. Although debates about the Brown opinion's impact on
school integration levels persist, that Brown contributed to increased
school integration in some (indeed, perhaps many) districts is beyond
dispute. Commentators rightly assume that Brown-inspired efforts to
increase public school integration have yielded critical dividends in
such communities as Shaker Heights, Ohio; Berkeley, California; and
Evanston, Illinois.
A closer examination of districts especially noted for their
successful desegregation and integrated educational experiences,
however, reveals potential causes for concern. A comparison between
school demographic profiles and the relevant residential demographic
profiles hints at instability. Table 2 focuses on five of the most
frequently cited examples of successful school integration efforts.
These school districts are also among the nation's most desirable,
high-performing suburban public high schools.
One key trend joins school districts where judicial efforts to
increase school integration have failed (Table 1) and districts that are
widely acknowledged to have successfully established integrated
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 38, at 17, tbl.13.
Id.
Id.
The district poverty figures are reported in Jerald & Curran, supra note 42, at 64-65.
Id.
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school systems (Table 2). In every instance, the percentage of white,
non-Hispanic residents residing in the successfully integrated school
districts exceeds the percentage of white students attending the
district's public high school. 57 To be sure, the magnitude of the
differences in the successfully integrated school districts in Table 2 is
less than the differences noted in Table 1. This is a question of degree
and not of kind, however. What is critical is that the same trend
persists. White households-even in successful, well-to-do school
districts celebrated for academic achievement and integrationcontinue to exercise education options by removing their children from
integrated public high schools at a much higher rate than their nonwhite counterparts. Despite residing in some of the nation's most
sought-after suburban locations (highly sought after, in large part,
due to their high-achieving public schools), white families nevertheless
continue to favor private schools over public schools. Current trends
suggest that gradual resegregation, already in progress even in
"successfully" desegregated districts, will likely persist. 58

57. These suburbs were selected, in part, because they each have only one public high
school serving the community. Thus, the high schools' demographic profiles capture the entire
areas' high-school-age cohorts attending public school.
58. See, e.g., William D. Henderson, Demography and Desegregationin the Cleveland Public
Schools: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Educational Failure and Success, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 457, 543-44, 544 tbl.11 (2001) (noting the slow decline in the number of white
students attending public school in Shaker Heights, Ohio).
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TABLE 2. DISTRICT RESIDENTIAL POPULATION 59 AND PUBLIC
HIGH SCHOOL ENROLLMENT, 60 BY RACE AND ETHNICITY IN
"SUCCESSFULLY" INTEGRATED DISTRICTS (PERCENT)

Shaker Heights, OH
Evanston, IL
White Plains, NY
Berkeley, CA
Oak Park-River Forest, IL

Residential

Public High School

White, non-Hispanic

White, non-Hispanic

59.3
62.6
54.2
55.2
69.9

44.3
50.6
40.4
41.4
64.6

From the admittedly
narrow
perspective
of school
desegregation, even a charitable read of the data suggests that Brown
has delivered little more than limited success.
Moreover, what
frequently counts as "success" in this context is both tenuous and
fragile. In sum, a fifty-year judicial effort to integrate public schoolslaunched by the Brown opinion-has generated, at best, mixed results.
Prospects for future success appear dim.
Indeed, some school
desegregation proponents-those on the frontlines of this effortconclude that, if anything, public school integration will likely degrade
61
in the future.
C. Accounts of Brown and School Desegregation
Many standard explanations about Brown's failure to integrate
fully American schools dwell on the courts. Although it is abundantly
clear that Brown I's "all deliberate speed"62 relief valve facilitated
resistance to Brown in the South and elsewhere, responsibility for
implementation delay and overall inefficacy is appropriately borne by
other court decisions (as well as numerous nonlegal factors). The
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Milliken63 clipped the Brown
decision's wings far more severely than Brown IL Where Brown I1
59. See supra note 48.
60. See supra note 49.
61. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1622 n.190 (2003) (calling for a "major
national initiative" for school desegregation).
62. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown I1].
63. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) [hereinafter Milliken I] (holding that suburban
school districts cannot be compelled to participate in metropolitan remedies absent suburban
school district constitutional violations).
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slowed down the pace of school desegregation, the Milliken decision
effectively brought it to a close, at least in any meaningful sense.
Finally, about the same time that school desegregation was
atrophying under its own weight, the courts accelerated the process by
establishing criteria to unwind judicial supervision of court-ordered
64
school desegregation monitoring.
More recent explanations gaze deeper into the legal terrain and
place substantial responsibility on the Supreme Court. Professor
Chemerinsky argued that a series of Supreme Court decisions
interacted in a way that "substantially contributed to" recent
resegregation. 65 Specifically, Chemerinsky argues that Brown II and
the Milliken decisions, along with related decisions bearing on school
68
finance (Rodriguez66), intent (Keyes 67 ), and unitary status (Dowell )
evidenced the Court's failure to embrace Brown and doomed the legal
effort to achieve school integration. 69 Chemerinsky's conclusion is
quite clear: "Desegregation likely would have been more successful,
and resegregation less likely to occur, if the Supreme Court had made
70
different choices."
It would be easy, perhaps, to quibble with such qualifiers as
"more successful" and "less likely." It would be equally easy to mire in
the debate about whether school integration levels are "bad" or "good"
and what they might suggest about Brown's efficacy. To do so,
however, risks obscuring a larger point. As is frequently the case, the
interaction of legal and nonlegal factors accounts for social change,
including school desegregation.
Two nonlegal factors that explain a lot about school integration
today are absent from many accounts of why the Brown decision
achieved so little in terms of school desegregation. These two factors
are: (1) where people choose to live, and (2) middle- and upper-income
families' access to private schools.
Both factors animate school
desegregation due to their interactions with two seminal Supreme
Court decisions, Pierce v. Society of Sisters71 and Milliken v. Bradley.7 2
64. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246-50 (1991) (requiring a showing of
good faith compliance and elimination of "the vestiges of past discrimination" to modify a
desegregation decree instead of the more rigorous Swift standard that required a showing of
"grievous wrong").
65. Chemerinsky, supranote 61, at 1600.
66. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
67. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
68. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
69. Chemerinsky, supra note 61, passim.
70. Id. at 1620.
71. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that states may compel education, but not public
education).
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The consequence of both factors remains largely outside the direct
reach of law and legal institutions. The mixed school desegregation
evidence reflects the limits of litigation as a tool for social change as
much as it does the limits of Brown and subsequent Supreme Court
decisions.
1. Where People Live
Among the numerous and complex factors that explain today's
low school integration levels, persisting residential segregation surely
occupies an exalted position. Although national residential
segregation levels declined between 1980 and 1990, the decline was
73
neither large nor evenly distributed throughout the United States.
Specifically, most of the decline concentrated in the South and West,
comparatively newer population centers, and in areas where the
74
absolute and relative percentages of African-Americans were small.
At the risk of disparaging progress on the residential front, the more
salient points are that residential segregation remains significant and
that change is both arduous and slow.
Residential segregation is, important both in and of itself, and
in terms of how it interacts with other factors, notably preferences for
neighborhood school assignment policies. The consequence of the
interaction is obvious: The application of neighborhood school
assignment policies onto residentially segregated areas will, in turn,
generate segregated schools. The prominence of neighborhood school
assignment policies makes disaggregating school and residential
segregation patterns necessary. To understand the latter is to better
75
understand the former.
Despite decades of efforts aimed at eliminating racial
residential segregation, 76 data suggest that residential segregation
has increased. African-Americans are more segregated today than
they were in 1940. 77 Moreover, one-third of all African-Americans live

72. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (preferencing local school district autonomy over urban districts'
integration needs).
73. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 221-23 & tbl.8.1 (1993).

74. Id.
75. Nancy A. Denton, The Persistenceof Segregation:Links Between Residential Segregation
and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795, 796 (1996) ("One need not delve exhaustively into
the research on school desegregation to find acknowledgment of the important effect of
residential segregation on school segregation.").
76. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1965, 1975-81 (2000).
77. Id. at 1980.
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under "hypersegregated" conditions, which means that they live in
large, contiguous, racially homogeneous neighborhoods clustered
around major urban centers. 78 What this means in a practical sense is
that many African-Americans, living in cities like Atlanta, Baltimore,
Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and New York City
are not likely to encounter any whites in their own neighborhoods, the
neighborhoods adjacent to theirs', or the ones adjacent to those. 79 A
similar general pattern holds for Hispanics, the fastest growing
80
segment of the public-school population.
The same Court that endorsed an effort to integrate public
schools 8 ' also concluded that local autonomy precluded interdistrict
school desegregation remedies. These two principles-a desire for
integrated schools and respect for local governmental autonomycollided when it came to school desegregation. Simply put, the Court
could not have it both ways. In the end, local autonomy trumped. In
Milliken 11 the Court implicitly realized the empirical realities of the
collision and concluded that monetary relief in the form of
supplemental state and federal funds would have to suffice for
minority children attending racially identifiable schools.8 2 Thus,
"[w]hat was true for Detroit became true for a host of other
metropolitan areas in the North and West: Students in urban school
districts would be confined to those districts but would receive
83
additional resources under the guise of 'desegregation' remedies."
What is clear after fifty years is that the Brown decision did
not dislodge the tight link bonding residential patterns and school
enrollment patterns. Moreover, the Milliken P'4 decision in 1974 can
be read to imply that the link endures partly because of the Brown
decision. For whatever reason, the overwhelming majority of public
school students attend neighborhood schools and, as a consequence,
public schools are as segregated as the neighborhoods in which they
78. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 73, at 74-78.
79. Id.
80. ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 38 at 3-4, 6-7.
81. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1971)
(approving court-ordered intradistrict busing to achieve school integration); Green v. County Sch.
Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (ordering the school board to come forward with a plan to integrate
its schools).
82. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 286-90 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken II] (holding that
states could be required to fund remedial and compensatory programs in formerly segregated
schools).
83. James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The PoliticalEconomy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J.
2043, 2055 (2002); see also James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 263-66
(1999) [hereinafter Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money] (discussing school districts' attempts at
getting resources for "desegregation remedies").
84. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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are located and serve. Thus, Professor Chemerinsky is surely correct
to identify such Court decisions as Milliken as degrading Brown's
ability to integrate public schools.8 5 Milliken and other decisions,
however, are only part of the story. Another critical part involves the
individual decisions about where to live. Milliken only becomes
relevant after families make housing decisions. Just how the Milliken
decision itself might feed into individual housing decisions is a critical
counterfactual without a clear answer. What is clear, however, is
that, owing to individual choices and, perhaps, other factors,
neighborhoods in most metropolitan areas are remarkably segregated
by race and class.
Given the severity of residential segregation and the Brown
decision's inability to overcome it, that public schools remain similarly
segregated by class and race should surprise few, if any. Thus, while
Brown perhaps succeeded in eliminating de jure segregated schools, it
did not achieve the larger goal of integrating public schools. Simply
put, a critical variable-residential housing patterns-fell outside of
the Court's jurisdiction and control.
In addition, judicial and
nonjudicial efforts to overcome residential housing patterns (for
example, mandatory and voluntary busing plans and racially sensitive
magnet schools) proved inadequate to overcome the immense force of
residential and socioeconomic patterns.
2. School Choice
Another critical factor influencing school integration levels
since Brown is families' access to private schools, especially white
families' access. Historically, the intersection of school choice and race
is cast in an unflattering light. In the middle of the twentieth century,
school choice, as an education policy, flourished in the South
principally as a tool of white resistance to federal court desegregation
efforts.8 6 More recent history, however, rehabilitates school choice
policies' implication for minorities and integration. During the 1980s
and 1990s, school choice was a policy lever designed to increase racial
integration, principally through magnet schools and intradistrict
transfer policies8 7 It is deeply ironic that, despite their odious
85. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 61, at 1607-09.
86. Betsy Levin, Race and School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY:
POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAw 266, 267-68 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999)
[hereinafter SCHOOL CHOICE].
87. JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR

110-11 (1994) (describing "controlled choice" plans); KAHLENBERG, supra note 28, at 116-30
(same); JOSEPH VITERITrI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL

SOCIETY 58-60 (1999) (same).
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beginnings, school choice policies are now advanced as a way to
increase school integration.
88
Although a variety of school choice options now exist,
including the largest variant-parents selecting where to live based on
the quality of public schools in a residential area 8 9 -a critical point is
that decisions to exit public for private schools benefit from
constitutional protection, notwithstanding their implications for school
integration. Just as Milliken helped insulate decisions about where
people live from the full reach of court-ordered school desegregation
plans, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,90 decided decades before Brown,
insulated private decisions about whether to exit public schools.
Numerous factors account for private schools' attractiveness for
white and non-white families that have nothing to do with race. Such
factors include school size and teacher satisfaction. Growing evidence
hints at the impact of school and classroom size on student learning, 9 1
and private schools have the advantage of smaller average school
enrollments. 92 Another comparative advantage is that private school
teachers reported higher levels of satisfaction across an array of
93
dimensions compared to their public school counterparts.
Despite some private schools' comparative attractiveness, it is
important to emphasize the comparatively small footprint that private
elementary and secondary schools generate in the elementary and
secondary school market. In 1999-2000, private schools accounted for
just over 24 percent of the nation's schools and served just over 10
percent of the nation's schoolchildren. 94 Because private school
students do not benefit from public tuition subsidies, 95 access to many
private schools is largely a function of household wealth. To the
extent that race and household wealth correlate, one would expect to
find private schools attended by a disproportionate number of white
Private school enrollment data comport with this
students.

88. For a full discussion, see Ryan & Heise, supra note 83, at 2063-85.
89. For a comprehensive discussion of residential public school choice, see Jeffrey R. Henig
& Stephen D. Sugarman, The Nature and Extent of School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note
86, at 14-17.
90. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
91. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 28, at 86-90.
92.

NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PRIVATE SCHOOLS: A BRIEF

PORTRAIT 6 tbl.3 (2002) [hereinafter A BRIEF PORTRAIT].
93. Id. at 16 tbl.9.
94. Id. at 3 tbl.1.
95. I exclude for sake of discussion the relatively and absolutely small number of publiclySee Ryan & Heise, supra note 83, at 2078-85
funded private school voucher programs.
(describing the three existing programs in the nation, which accounted for a total of less than
15,000 students, and why the programs have met with such modest success).
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expectation. Compared to public schools, private schools educate a
disproportionately higher percentage of white students and
correspondingly lower percentage of African-American and Hispanic
96
students.
Regardless of the reasons for private schools' attractiveness,
what is clear is that white households disproportionately exercise
their constitutionally protected option of exiting public for private
schools. As Tables 1 and 2 illustrate, this pattern holds in the nation's
largest cities as well as in some of the most sought-after and
As a consequence, school
integrated suburban communities.
desegregation efforts suffer. Public schools are even less integrated
than the residential population would otherwise predict. While school
desegregation policy and law can (and does) seek to influence such
private decisions, they cannot control such decisions.
III. POSTDESEGREGATION EFFORTS TO ENHANCE EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY THROUGH LITIGATION

Although the Brown decision may have fallen short of
integrating America's public schools, it would be a manifest mistake to
assess the decision's legacy solely from the necessarily narrow and
incomplete lens of school desegregation. Postdesegregation efforts to
enhance equal educational opportunity through litigation-efforts that
flow directly from Brown-evidence a significant and singular
The Brown decision succeeded in stimulating a
achievement.
sustained effort-notably, but not exclusively, in the area of school
finance litigation-to deploy the courts to help insure greater equal
educational opportunity by supplying a necessary precedential
foundation upon which successive efforts rest.
A. School Finance Reform
The distribution of education resources, especially funding,
occupies a key role in current debates about equal educational
opportunity. Central to debates about the distribution of education
resources is school finance litigation. Consequently, this area of the
law has emerged during the past three decades as a tool to enhance
equal education opportunity.
School finance reform issues arise due to the interaction of
three factors. First, most school finance systems rely on a mixture of
state and local revenue, with localities funding the bulk of their

96.

See A BRIEF PORTRAIT, supra note 92, at 9 fig.3.
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contributions through property tax revenues. 97 Second, different
localities' property values vary and thus can raise disparate amounts
of funding for schools with similar property tax rates. Higher property
value areas find it comparatively easier (from a tax effort perspective)
to raise funds for their schools. States, especially since the mid-1980s,
make an array of efforts to equalize funding between high- and lowproperty value areas. The persistence of school spending differences,
not to mention the persistence of school finance lawsuits, however,
suggests that states' equalizing efforts fall short. Third, the slow and
uneven pace of school desegregation frustrates many civil rights
advocates.
Advocates had hoped that by attacking funding
inequalities, they would be able to improve the education available to
poor and minority students.
Unlike the federal court strategy deployed by school
desegregation activists, school finance litigants had to push their
claims in state rather than federal courts.
Despite some early
promise, 98 hopes for a federal litigation strategy were dealt an early
death in Rodriguez,99 where the Supreme Court concluded that
unequal school funding schemes do not violate the U.S.
Constitution. 10 0 Rather than terminate a litigation strategy for school
finance reformers, however, the Rodriguez decision instead redirected
the litigation strategy.
School finance advocates turned their
attention to state constitutions and state courts, where they have
experienced mixed results. Since 1974, litigants have challenged the
finance schemes in over forty states, and nearly twenty state supreme
courts have declared their respective school funding programs
unconstitutional. 10 1 Prior to 1989, those challenging school finance
systems generally sought to equalize resources among districts within
a state. 10 2 Since 1989, however, adequacy-based challenges have
largely supplanted equality-based claims. Most litigants now contend
not that all students are entitled to the same resources, but rather
that all students should receive the funds necessary to finance an

97. For an overview of school finance systems, see Allan R. Odden, School Finance and
Education Reform, in RETHINKING SCHOOL FINANCE 1 (Allan R. Odden ed., 1992).
98. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249-62 (Cal. 1971) (finding that a school funding
scheme based on local property taxes resulted in unconstitutional wealth-based discrimination).
99. 411 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1973).
100. Id.
101. For descriptions of, and citations to, the cases, see Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money,
supra note 83, at 266-69 & nn.70-86.
102. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School FinanceReform, 48
VAND. L. REV. 101, 121-40 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation,
and the "Third Wave" From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1157-62 (1995).
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adequate education. 10 3 Although much has been and could be said
about these cases,' 0 4 two features warrant emphasis. The first has to
do with the remedies that have been provided. The second has to do
with the changing nature of the claims that have been brought.
As for the remedies, an important aspect of school finance
litigation is that even successful challenges have not led to equal
funding, nor have any of the suits done much to alter the basic
structure of school finance schemes. 10 5 Indeed, only Nevada and
Hawaii have finance systems that could be described as providing
equal funding to all districts, and Hawaii is anomalous in that there is
only one school district for the entire state. 106 Inequalities caused by
differing property values thus continue to exist in nearly every state,
even in those states whose courts have ordered equalization. 10 7 Thus,
similar to school desegregation litigation, the school finance litigation
effort has encountered numerous difficulties.
Explanations for the inefficacy of even those school finance
lawsuits that were successful are not hard to fathom. To equalize
school funding, lawmakers confront one of two basic options: raise all
school districts to the budgetary level of the highest-spending ones, or
bring all districts down to a specified level and cap any spending
beyond that level. The first option is financially impractical in most
states. 10
The second option, while financially possible, is so
controversial that it is politically infeasible in most areas. 10 9
103. See Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 83, at 268-69 (describing the shift in
theories and pointing out that not all cases since 1989 have shifted from equity to adequacy
claims).
104. For an excellent overview of the cases and discussion of the commentary, see Enrich,
supra note 102, at 185-94.
105. There is a good deal of disagreement in the relevant literature regarding the precise
impact of court decisions on school funding. See Michael Heise, Equal EducationalOpportunity,
Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An EmpiricalPerspective and
Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 585-89 (1998). There is no disagreement, however,
regarding the central point made in the text: No school finance suit has led to equalized funding
among school districts in any state.
106. For a discussion of Hawaii's finance scheme, see John A. Thompson, Notes on the
Centralization of the Funding and Governance of Education in Hawaii, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 286
(1992). For a discussion of Nevada, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: STATE
EFFORTS TO EQUALIZE FUNDING BETWEEN WEALTHY AND POOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS 26 (1998)
[hereinafter SCHOOL FINANCE]. Nevada does not guarantee that all districts will have the same
funds; rather, in Nevada (and only in Nevada) all districts can raise the average per-pupil
funding amount at the same tax rate. See id.
107. See SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 106, at 2-8; see also Kirk Vandersall, Post-Brown
School Finance Reform, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY 11, 17-18 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed.,
1998) [hereinafter STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY] (discussing studies indicating little
improvement in funding equity during the 1980s, despite successful school finance litigation).
108. See Enrich, supra note 102, at 156 (noting that "bringing all districts up to the spending
or service level of the top districts would be prohibitively expensive in most states"); Thomas
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Much of the consternation arises because equalizing funding by
controlling local spending would require either a cap on local spending
or redistributing locally-raised revenues to other school districts. Not
surprisingly, neither option has proven to be politically popular. Local
citizens, especially parents, do not like to be told that they cannot
raise and spend local revenues on their own schools.1 1 ° Many like
even less the idea that their locally raised revenues might be
redirected to schools throughout the rest of the state."1
Such "Robin
Hood" schemes have succeeded mainly in provoking intense political
1 12
squabbling, public protests, and litigation.
Due to the controversy triggered by spending caps and
recapture plans, it is not surprising that almost no school finance
systems-even those reformed in response to a court order-limit the
amount that local districts can raise." 3 Similarly, very few states rely
on explicit recapture provisions." 4 Rather, states typically respond to
court orders by increasing state aid to poorer districts. 1 5 Although
states usually hold aid to wealthier districts constant or increase it at
Vitullo-Martin, Charter Schools and Tax Reform in Michigan, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL
EQUITY, supra note 107, at 115, 121-22 (calculating that it would cost Michigan an additional $7
billion in state aid (which would double state spending) to bring all districts up to the level of the
wealthiest districts).
109. For a discussion of the political difficulties raised by limiting spending or redistributing
locally-raised revenues, see Margaret E. Goertz, Steady Work: The Courts and School Finance
Reform in New Jersey, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY, supra note 107, at 101, 111-13; Molly
S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distributionof Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of School
FinanceLitigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 9, at 88, 108-15; Enrich, supra note
102, at 157-59.
110. See generally Richard Rothstein, Assessing Money's Role in Making Schools Better, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at D12 (discussing the "extraordinary growth of private gifts to public
schools); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 156 (2001) (explaining the tight
link between local school quality and housing values).
111. For a discussion of this point, see William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions
Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by
Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721, 731, 739 (1992); Enrich,
supra note 102, at 156-59.
112. For a discussion of legislative reactions in Texas, see Albert Cortez, Power and
Perseverance:Organizing For Change in Texas, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY, supra note
107, at 181, 181-97; Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 499 (1991); Sam Howe Verhovek, Texans Reject Sharing School Wealth, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 1993, at A12. For Kansas, see FISCHEL, supranote 110, at 120-21.
113. See FISCHEL, supra note 110, at 93 (noting that "Colorado and Washington are among
the very few states that place limits on how much revenue school districts can choose to raise on
their own").
114. See id.; Enrich, supra note 102, at 158; McUsic, supra note 109, at 111.
115. See SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 106, at 20-29 (discussing state efforts at equalization);
William N. Evans et al., Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses After Serrano, 16 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 10, 12 (1997) (concluding from a study of litigation and legislative responses
that "[clourt-ordered reform reduced inequality by raising spending at the bottom of the
distribution while leaving spending at the top unchanged").
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a slower rate than aid to poorer districts, 116 wealthier districts usually
retain the authority to use their own revenues and spend more than
the poorer districts can afford. 117 Providing more state aid to poorer
districts while holding such aid to wealthier districts constant is
redistributive and not without controversy of its own." 8 But the
controversy generated by redistribution is nowhere near as intense as
that created by recapture provisions.
A second notable feature of school finance litigation is the
evolution in litigation strategies from equalization claims to adequacy
claims. Legislators are not the only ones to have recognized the
political difficulty in equalizing resources. Litigants have as well, and
these difficulties have generally altered the goal of school finance
litigation. Prior to 1989, legal challenges to school funding programs
primarily sought greater equalization in per-pupil spending."1 9 Since
1989, however, adequacy-based theories have largely displaced equity
theories. Presently, most school finance litigants argue not that all
students are entitled to equalized per-pupil spending, but rather that
all students deserve the funds necessary to support an adequate
education. 20 Adequacy lawsuits make peace with funding inequality
and abandon the idea of tying districts together financially by
requiring access to equal resources.
Wealthy school districts
possessing the ability and willingness to self-fund a more-thanadequate education remain free to do so.
A number of factors help explain the switch in legal strategies
and goals in 1989 from equity to adequacy. School finance equity
theory's inefficacy was one such factor. Equity-based school finance
lawsuits had win rates that were not satisfactory. 121
Moreover,
similar to many successful school desegregation lawsuits, even
successful school finance equity lawsuits failed to achieve the litigants'
desired goals. To make this point more specifically, empirical research
on successful equity lawsuits' ability to increase total state education
122
spending reveals mixed results.
116. Evans, supra note 115, at 12.
117. Enrich, supranote 102, at 158.
118. The long-running controversy in New Jersey is probably the most well-known example.
For an insightful discussion of the school finance saga in that state, see Goertz, supra note 109.
119. Enrich, supra note 102, at 121-40; Heise, supra note 102, at 1152-53.
120. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 83, at 268-69 (describing the shift in school
finance litigation theory).
121. Id. at 268-69.
122. Heise, supra note 105, at 623; see also Bradley W. Joondeph, The Good, The Bad, and
The Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation-Prompted School Finance Reform, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 763, 774 (1995) (same). But cf. DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 34-35 (2001) (surveying the empirical
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A second factor involves school finance activists' desire to bring
many urban school districts back into the school finance movement.
Historically, many urban districts were on the forefront of school
finance litigation. In New Jersey, for instance, the Robinson v.
Cahil1123 litigation exemplifies the initial joining of urban school
districts and the school finance movement. During the 1970s, urban
districts in New Jersey were among the state's poorest.
Their
financial plight resulted from low property values, high tax burdens,
high noneducation claims upon the cities' financial resources, and
relatively high cost-of-education rates per student. 124 These factors,
among others, contributed to many urban districts' embrace of early
school finance litigation.
Over time, however, per-pupil spending in urban districts
improved. This improvement diminished the appetite for the equity
version of school finance reform in these districts.
By 1990,
unadjusted per-pupil spending in urban districts exceeded suburban
and rural spending levels.1 25 A distinct, though related, development
was that as a school district's percentage of minority students rose, so
too did per-pupil spending.1 2 6 Once urban districts began spending as
much as other districts, if not more, potential plaintiffs realized that
litigation efforts seeking strict equality of resources state-wide might
harm them financially. 127 Consequently, as urban school spending
levels came up to state per-pupil spending averages, the taste in
urban districts for school finance equity litigation cooled. Once school
finance litigation's theoretical base shifted from equity to adequacy,
however, urban districts' relatively high per-pupil spending no longer
precluded them from joining such lawsuits.
Third, along with increasing the number of political allies,
school finance litigants also sought to minimize political foes. Seeking
adequate instead of equal resources is politically less controversial,
because it does not raise the specter of leveling down through
spending caps or recapture provisions. Adequacy arguments pose less
of a political threat than equality arguments because they do not
literature and noting that the weight of scholarly authority supports the proposition that equity
and adequacy school finance lawsuits influence education spending).
123. 303 A.2d 273 (1977).
124. Paul L. Tractenberg, Robinson v. Cahill: The "Thorough and Efficient" Clause, 38 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 312, 316 (1974).
125. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DISPARITIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT SPENDING,

1989-1990 A1-E7 (Appendix) (1995) [hereinafter DISPARITIES]; see also Heise, supra note 102, at
1151, 1173 tbl.1. When per-pupil spending is indexed by cost and need deflators, urban spending
levels remain above suburban levels, but below rural spending. Id.
126. DISPARITIES, supra note 125, at 15 tbl.1; Heise, supra note 102, at 1174 tbl.2.
127. See Heise, supra note 105, at 579-83; Heise, supra note 102, at 1172-74.
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interfere with local control over resources or preclude wealthy
128
districts' ability to retain superior funding positions.
B. Themes: An Enduringand Evolving Equal Educational
Opportunity Doctrine
Although school desegregation and finance
litigation
movements differ in important ways, they also share important
attributes. That the two movements differ merely states the obvious:
the former dwells on race, the latter on money. Given the persistent
challenges attributable to the American "dilemma,"' 29 even this
symbolic change in focus should not be discounted. These important
differences notwithstanding, the school desegregation and finance
movements also resemble one another in critical ways. As Professor
James Ryan has noted, "[O]ne cannot fully understand the dynamics
and limitations of school finance reform without considering the
' 130
dynamics of race in general and school desegregation in particular."
Put simply, although the technical focus may have shifted from race to
resources, many of the underlying objectives persist. Shared goals,
history, focus on inputs, and an enduring belief in the power of
litigation bind school desegregation and finance.
1. Goals and History
Although the school desegregation and finance movements
pursue different means, they share common goals. At bottom, both
movements seek to enhance educational opportunity for poor and
minority (and all too frequently, poor minority) students. 13' This
shared goal is unsurprising given the movements' shared history. The
substitution of race for resources-the touchstone of school finance
litigation-emerged in a desegregation case. Having previously struck

128. Enrich, supra note 102, at 168-69; see also McUsic, supra note 109, at 119 (arguing that
adequacy claims have "political" advantages over equality claims, including the fact that "[u]nder
adequacy claims, [wealthy] districts remain free to exploit their local property wealth in pursuit
of educational excellence").
129. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944) (chronicling the findings
of "a comprehensive study of the Negro in the United States").
130. James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432,
476 (1999).
131. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 83, at 254. Compare RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S

STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY passim (1975) (describing the NAACP's school desegregation strategies
and litigation goals), with RICHARD F. ELMORE & MILBREY W. MCLAUGHLIN, REFORM AND
RETRENCHMENT: THE POLITICS OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 21-32 (1982)

(describing school finance litigation goals).
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down the lower court's metropolitan school desegregation plan in
Milliken 1,132 the Supreme Court all but precluded a racially
integrated educational experience for most of Detroit's public school
students. In response to the Court's decision in Milliken I, the district
court ordered an array of compensatory educational programs
designed to offset the harms generated by racially identifiable schools.
In Milliken 11,133 the Court assessed the appropriateness of the courtordered school desegregation remedy which, in essence, swapped
supplemental funding for the absence of an integrated school setting.
As Justice Powell noted, the complaining party in Milliken II was the
State of Michigan, and its complaint pivoted not on desegregation but
on the $5.8 million cost to the state for implementing the remedial
plan. 134 The Court concluded that the district court's mandated
compensatory program, while perhaps not ideal, was a constitutional
"second-best" and aptly tailored to address and remedy the
educational consequences of the constitutional violation. 13 5 While
some desegregation proponents continue to bemoan the 5-4 Milliken I
decision and its consequences, 136 few dispute the nature of the
exchange that implicitly took place.
2. Tying Strategy
The school desegregation and finance efforts share a key
strategic attribute in that they each initially pursued a "tying"
strategy.137 On the dual assumption that minority students would be
at a political disadvantage in terms of assuring adequate education
resources, and that whites would ensure that their children benefited
from adequate school resources, school desegregation proponents
sought to protect minority students' interests by eliminating de jure
segregation policies.
That is, minority students would benefit
financially just by having legal access to white schools. 138 Of course,
the Brown decision's elimination of de jure school segregation and
minority students' legal access to white public schools were not
enough to insure integrated public schools. Many minority students
132. 418 U.S. 717.
133. 433 U.S. 267.
134. Id. at 293 (Powell, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 290.
136. See, e.g., Gary Orfield, Conservative Activists and the Rush Toward Resegregation, in
LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 9, at 48-49.
137. Sources for discussion of the "tying" strategy include Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money,
supra note 83, at 259-60, and Ryan & Heise, supra note 83, at 2058-59.
138. For a discussion of the "green follows white" hypothesis, see Martha Minow, Reforming
School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 275 (1999).
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still attend overwhelmingly minority schools. As a result, the "green
follows white" hypothesis was not fully tested.' 39 Consequently, the
desegregation effort which aimed to protect the fates of minority
students by tethering them to the fates of white students through
student assignment policies proved insufficient to guarantee an
equitable distribution of educational resources. That is, in a world of
de facto school segregation, minority students' education remained
exposed to the politics of school finance.
To preserve a tying strategy, school finance litigants sought to
enhance equity by changing the unit of analysis from the student to
the school. Specifically, whereas school desegregation sought to tie
the fates of white and black students together by placing them in the
same schools, school finance equalization sought to tether the fates of
poor and wealthy schools together by ensuring equal distribution of
resources. 140
Similar to desegregation litigants, so long as one
assumes that constituents of wealthy school districts will exert
sufficient political force to guarantee sufficient resources for their
schools, efforts to link the political fates of poor and wealthy school
districts in terms of educational resources should provide students
attending poor schools additional protections.
Ironically, the school desegregation and finance movements
also share an abandonment of the tying strategy. In the end, efforts to
legally link the fates of minority and nonminority students as well as
wealthy and nonwealthy school districts proved largely futile. In the
desegregation setting, the Milliken I decision combined with
residential demographic patterns that remain segregated by both race
and socioeconomic status to preclude meaningful efforts to commingle
minority and nonminority students in public schools. Milliken Iis
explicit swap of integrated education for additional resources
implicitly extinguished the tying strategy in the school desegregation
context. A similar abandonment of the tying strategy took place in the
school finance context. The legal, political, and economic difficulties
associated with equalizing school spending gave way to an adequacy
theory that no longer seeks to bind the fates of wealthy and
nonwealthy school districts.
3. Focus on Inputs Over Outcomes
A shared belief in the power of inputs to influence desired
education outcomes binds the school desegregation and school finance

139. Id. at 274-75.
140. See supra note 137.
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movements. School desegregation and school finance lawsuits were
designed to increase school integration and school spending levels,
respectively.
These lawsuits assumed that manipulating racial
balances and resources would lead to improved student achievement.
Upon finding unconstitutional school segregation in Kansas City,
Missouri, the district court in Jenkins v. Missouri 41 developed a
remedy with the goal of eliminating "all vestiges of state imposed
segregation," with a particular emphasis on eliminating "low student
achievement."'1 42 School finance court opinions are no less specific. In
Rose v. Council for Better Education, 43 the Kentucky Supreme Court
construed the state's education clause to provide each and every child
with, among other things, "sufficient levels of academic or vocational
skills to enable [Kentucky] public school students to compete favorably
with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the
144
job market."
The school desegregation and finance movements' belief that
attention to such inputs as race and funding could improve student
academic achievement is not without controversy. For many involved
in education reform efforts, the ultimate barometer of success or
failure is student academic achievement. However, precisely what
causes some students to perform well and others to perform poorly
remains hotly debated in the research literatures. Thus far, a loose
consensus gels on the importance of peer effects on student academic
achievement and social behavior. 45 There is also emerging agreement
that good teachers, strong principals, small schools, small class sizes,
and parental involvement can improve student achievement, but the
146
significance of these variables remains subject to heated debate.
Added to these specific areas of contest is the more general dispute

141. 639 F. Supp. 19, 23-25 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
142. Id. at 23; see generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (noting that
segregation adversely impacts the educational development of African-American students);
JAMES S. COLEMAN, EQUALITY AND ACHIEVEMENT IN EDUCATION 211-13 (1990) (recognizing

African-American student academic achievement as a central policy goal of desegregation).
143. 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (1989).
144. Id. at 212; see also William E. Thro, JudicialAnalysis During the Third Wave of School
Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 612-15 (1994)
(describing school finance litigation as a strategy to improve student academic achievement).
145. James Coleman was the first to report this, in his famous 1966 study for the (now)
Department of Education, which has since become known simply as "The Coleman Report."
COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 304. Scores of subsequent studies have confirmed Coleman's
conclusion. For citations to the literature, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 28, at 25-28; Ryan,
Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 83, at 286-87 & nn.165-66.
146. See generally KAHLENBERG, supra note 28, at 86-90 (discussing research).
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over the extent to which expenditures correlate with achievement14 7
that is, over whether money "matters."'
Setting aside such long-standing debates, what is reasonably
clear is that something as complex as student academic achievement
almost assuredly does not pivot on any single variable, such as
funding, teacher quality, racial composition, or class size. Equally
clear is that schools with a majority of poor students rarely, if ever,
perform as well as their middle-class counterparts. 148 This holds true
even when substantial resources are provided to these schools.
Although several reasons explain why this is so, the key point is the
clear and undisputed one that schools of concentrated poverty almost
always perform poorly. Although the litigants' focus on school
desegregation and finance is hardly inapt, a belief that either school
integration levels 149 or funding levels 150 alone could influence
academic achievement ignores the rich complexity that characterizes
student academic achievement.
4. Faith in Litigation and Legal Impact
The school desegregation and finance litigation movements
share a faith in the ability of lawsuits to influence social change. The
coordinated litigation strategy that culminated with the Brown
decision helped animate a movement towards pressing courts into the

147. For research generally skeptical of a correlation between educational spending and
educational achievement, see Eric A. Hanushek, The Impact of Differential Expenditures on
School Performance, 18 EDUC. RESEARCHER 45, 49-50 (1989); ERIC A. HANUSHEK ET AL., MAKING
SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS 25-48 (1994); ALLAN R.
ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 277-81 (1992). For

research generally supportive of such a correlation, see Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public
Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 483-90
(1991); Larry V. Hedges et al., Does Money Matter? A Meta-Analysis of Studies of the Effects of
Differential School Inputs on Student Outcomes, 23 EDUC. RESEARCHER 5, 13 (1994).

148. For a fuller account of this point, see Ryan & Heise, supra note 83, at 2103-08.
149. Although the empirical evidence on the influence of school desegregation on student
academic achievement remains contested, a few general themes have emerged. On balance,
desegregation appears to have a positive - though moderate - impact on black student
achievement, though no corresponding effect on white student achievement. Other researchers
imply, however, that, rather than desegregation, per se, what matters is socioeconomic
integration that happens to correlate, though obviously not perfectly, with racial integration.
For a sampling of the debate, compare Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on Minority
Achievement in Desegregated Schools, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 103,

121-25 (Christine R. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983) (finding a consistent, positive impact
from school desegregation), with ARMOR, supra note 47, at 113 (largely pessimistic of a school
desegregation effect independent of a socioeconomic influence).
150. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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service of "litigated reform." 151 The service quickly extended beyond
schools, and the nation's activist lawyers and judges grew accustomed
to permanent injunctions as well as court supervision of public
institutions. What emerged was a "new kind of case" that assisted
152
litigants seeking to achieve institutional reform through litigation.
This "new kind of case" substantially departed from Lon Fuller's
vision of the court's role as an adjudicator of private disputes through
153
the structured, adversarial process.
Legal scholars soon followed with descriptions of public law
15 5
According to Chayes, public law
litigation 154 and defenses of it.
dislodge
by
helping
democracy
enriches
our
litigation
underperforming public institutions from the status quo. Public law
litigants are less amenable to capture and, paradoxically, better
positioned to introduce change into public institutions than the
that have formal governing and
bureaucratic mechanisms
Critics, however, dwell on public law
policymaking authority.
litigation's tenuous fit within traditional notions of separation of
156
powers. Questions about political legitimacy persist.
Independent of important theoretical and normative questions
surrounding the courts' role in helping to achieve reform or social
change, equally important empirical questions lurk regarding whether
courts can be effectively deployed in such a manner. The legal impact
debate benefited from the discussion prompted by Professor Gerald
Rosenberg's analysis, which asked: "To what degree, and under what
conditions, can judicial processes be used to produce political and
social change?"' 57 Rosenberg, a trained political scientist as well as
law school graduate, noted that in law school classes "the idea that the
Supreme Court played a fundamental role in reshaping modern

151. Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: InstitutionalReform Litigation as Litigation,
97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1995 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN,
JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S
PRISONS (1998)).

152. Id. As Professor Schlanger notes, this "new kind of case" was termed, variously, "public
law," "institutional," and "structural" litigation. Id.
153. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 363-72
(1978). As Professor Schlanger notes, Fuller's article-published in 1978-was written in 1957.
See Schlanger, supra note 151, at 1996 n.il.
154. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1288-1313 (1976).
155. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44-50
(1979).
156. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (2004).
157. ROSENBERG, supra note 37, at 1.
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American society was uncritically assumed by all."158 That uncritical
assumption was welcomed by many, especially many legal scholars
and activists. 5 9
Rosenberg critically examines the assumption that courts can
produce political and social change and advances a conclusion that
disappoints those who look to courts to end-run political processes
resulting in policy change. Rosenberg concludes that courts can
influence policy change only when non-judicial actors support such a
change 160 and notes that "U.S. courts can almost never be effective
producers of significant social reform." 161
Not surprisingly,
Rosenberg's book attracted substantial criticism. 62
A softer form of Rosenberg's thesis-that courts, under certain
conditions and with certain issues, can produce social and political
change, but not nearly as much as many people seem to think 163would not surprise those current in the political science, legal impact,
and constitutional theory literatures. Robert Dahl's influential work
led many to view the judicial process as one among many critical
factors that inform national policy issues.1 64 Other scholars, such as
Alexander Bickel, emphasized structural factors that limit the scope of
courts' reach in the policy setting.' 65 Finally, Donald Horowitz began
to assess with more focus court decisions' consequencesunanticipated and otherwise-on policy.166
If what Rosenberg wrote is noted for provoking criticism, how
he developed his thesis represents a significant contribution. Though

158. Id. at xi (emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE

9 (1982) (arguing that "litigation has earned the acceptance it now enjoys of its place in resolving
public policy questions").
160. ROSENBERG, supra note 37, at 30-36.
161. Id. at 338.
162. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Judicial Matters: The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change?, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1992) (reviewing GERALD. N. ROSENBERG, THE

HOLLOW HOPE (1991)) ("The book deserves harsh criticism because its conclusions are checkered
by problems of emphasis, articulation, and analysis."). To be fair, the same reviewer also noted
that Rosenberg's book can "stand tall, if not erect, even in the face of the deficiencies noted
above." Id.
163. ROSENBERG, supra note 37, at 342-43 (noting that courts "rarely... can make a
difference").
164. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making In a Democracy: The Supreme Court As a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
165. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16-23, 254-72 (1962).
166. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 284-93 (1977).
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not the first of such work, 167 Rosenberg's analysis represents a
growing recognition of the need to link legal theory and empirical
reality to increase our understanding of when and how courts
Indeed, empirical work on the relation
influence social policy.
between courts and education policy is comparatively more developed
than in other contexts. Although Rosenberg finds little reason for
faith in courts' ability to bring about increased school integration, 16
other scholars interpret available data as rebutting the general claim
that the "judiciary lacks the resources, expertise, or comprehensive
1 69
perspective needed to implement education reforms successfully."'
Within the more bounded context of school finance litigation, the
efficacy of successful lawsuits in bringing about desired social change
remains contested. Emerging evidence suggests that different school
finance litigation theories might generate different probabilities of
170
success.
Notwithstanding empirical ambiguity about litigation's efficacy
as a vehicle to achieve social change, public law litigation now enjoys
something of a renaissance. In a recent article, Professors Sabel and
Simon describe how public law litigation has been transformed and, as
a consequence, is "becoming-again-an influential and promising
instrument of democratic accountability."' 17 1 According to the authors,
what has changed over the years is the structure of public litigation's
remedies. Public litigants now shy away from "command-and-control"
injunctive judicial regulation and favor more "experimental" judicial
intervention. 172
Sabel and Simon understand such judicial
interventions to form a new genre of claims they describe as
"destabilization rights"-or, rights to disentrench public institutions,
such as public schools, which have failed to meet their obligations and
are immune to traditional political reform efforts. 173 Although their
claim that public law litigation, newly transformed, will resurrect
itself as an instrument of democratic control remains speculative, at a
descriptive level, the nature of the trend that Professors Sabel and

167. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, Back to the Future, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4, 42 (1990)
(noting that due to "two decades of gap studies, impact studies, and implementation research,"
law's independent ability to influence policy is in doubt).
168. ROSENBERG, supra note 37, at 155.
169. MICHAEL REBELL & ARTHUR BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING AND THE COURTS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 210 (1982).

170.
171.
172.
173.

For a discussion, see REED, supra note 122, at 34-35.
Sabel & Simon, supra note 156, at 1016.
Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1020.
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Simon observe is generally correct, at least as it relates to equal
educational opportunity litigation since Brown.174
IV. BROWN'S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION

Future litigants seeking to enhance equal educational
opportunity will confront far more challenging policy terrain. Similar
to education litigation theories, education policy continues to evolve
over time. Where past and present reform efforts focused on inputs
such as race and resources, current reform efforts construe equal
educational opportunity in terms of student achievement. A review of
student achievement data reveals lingering achievement gaps that
separate students by race and ethnicity.
Many view these
achievement gaps as posing an especially potent threat to the promise
of equal educational opportunity. 175 Reducing these gaps is difficult
because student academic achievement involves an array of
complicated and interacting variables, including teaching and
learning, as well as delicate school and non-school relations that are
essential to the learning process. Critical to litigation efforts is that
these variables are located deeper inside schools and classrooms and,
as such, further away from the reach of lawsuits and court decisions.
These variables' resistance to successful litigation evidences their
complexity as well as the structural limitations of law and litigation as
tools to influence such variables. To an even greater degree than for
school desegregation or finance, courts and lawsuits seem ill-equipped
to shoulder this task.
A. The PersistentlyEvolving Equal EducationalOpportunity
Doctrine-Standardsand Assessments
Conceptions of what equal educational opportunity doctrine
means and how to construe it continue to evolve.
Recent
developments evidence that the doctrine's focus is changing once
again, this time to include notions of educational excellence and
quality. Since the mid-1980s, equal educational opportunity has
increasingly been construed in terms of outputs (for example, student
and school academic achievement) rather than the traditional inputs
(such as racial composition of schools and per-pupil spending). This
174. Not surprisingly, school litigation figures prominently in their exposition of how public
law litigation has evolved over the decades. Id. at 1022-28.
175. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2001) (emphasizing the necessity
of closing the achievement gap to provide equal educational opportunity to all students).
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change in focus led educational reformers to push the development
and implementation of academic standards, as well as assessment
instruments designed to gauge progress toward those standards. This"
change in focus reflects the belief that what matters most is whether
children are learning and that this can only be assured if regular
assessments are administered to measure progress toward clear
performance standards. Proponents of standards and assessments
justified them partly as a way to increase student achievement and
Not surprisingly, the standards and
school accountability. 176
in the post-Brown effort
assessments movement also nests itself firmly
177
opportunity.
educational
greater
secure
to
A convergence of four factors helps explain this recent shift in
education policy focus. First, concerns about student achievement
have increased. Despite decades of well-intended education reforms,
American students do not perform at desired academic levels,
Also,
especially when compared to their foreign counterparts.17 8
persisting achievement gaps continue to separate African-American
and Hispanic students from white and Asian students.1 79 Second, the
1983 publication of the report, A Nation At Risk: The Imperative For
Educational Reform, publicized growing concerns about student
achievement.1 8 0 When it came to describing the scope of the problem
confronting American education, the report did not mince words:
"[T]he educational foundations of our society are presently being
eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as
a Nation and a people." 18' Third, many states increased their absolute
and relative financial contributions to local school budgets. Partly in
exchange for an increasing appetite for policy control and in response
to school finance litigation, between 1970 and 1990, states'

176. For a helpful summary of the social history of the standards and assessment movement
and its focus on student academic achievement, see CHESTER E. FINN, JR., WE MUST TAKE
CHARGE: OUR SCHOOLS AND OUR FUTURE (1991); DIANE RAVITCH, DEBATING THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN EDUCATION: DO WE NEED NATIONAL STANDARDS AND ASSESSMENTS? (1995).

177. See, e.g., William L. Taylor, Assessment as a Means to a Quality Education, 8 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 311, 311-12 (2001) (describing standards-based education reform as a
method for improving educational quality for all students).
178. Paul E. Peterson, Ticket To Nowhere, 3 EDUC. NEXT, Spring 2003, at 39, 45-46 & fig.5
(arguing that American students do not fare well in terms of international achievement).
179. See generally Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap:
An Introduction, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 1 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith

Phillips eds., 1998) (documenting persisting student achievement gaps between black and white
students).
180. See THE NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE
FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5-23 (1983).

181. Id. at 5.
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contribution to total educational spending (as a percentage of total
educational spending) grew by more than 18 percent.18 2
School reform in Texas is emblematic. In 1995, largely owing
to protracted school finance litigation, the Texas Supreme Court
provisionally accepted a new school funding scheme that accompanied
broader education reforms that included the creation of the Texas
School System Accountability program.18 3
The Texas Board of
Education administers the Accountability program and is charged
with designing and implementing
student standards
and
assessments. 8 4 Public schools in Texas are annually assessed on the
basis of student test scores and other proxies of academic success. 8 5
Successful schools are rewarded; unsuccessful schools face the
prospect of a state takeover. 8 6 A critical component of the Texas
school reform plan is its transparency. Data on student performance
(aggregated at the school level) as well as school and district
performances are available on the Internet.
Parents of Texas
schoolchildren receive assessment information about their children's
school directly through the mail. 8 7
Fourth, the federal government dramatically increased its
involvement with elementary and secondary public schools. In 1994,
President Clinton signed into law the Goals 2000: Educate America
Act, 88 which included financial incentives for states to embark upon
the standards and assessments development processes.18 9
In
response, many states initiated the difficult process of launching
efforts to articulate educational standards for their students and
schools as well as assessment mechanisms designed to assess progress
toward the articulated standards. 90

182. Heise, supra note 105, at 560 & fig.I.
183. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 725-30 (Tex. 1995); see also TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004) (describing provisions of Texas' Public School
Accountability program).
184. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.022 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004); see also id. § 7.102.
185. Id. §§ 39.051-.052
186. TEX. EDUC. CODE. ANN. §§ 39.023-.028, 39.051-.054, 39.071-.076, 39.093-.095, 39.131
(Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004). For a fuller discussion of the Texas Accountability plan, see Sabel
& Simon, supranote 156, 1025-28.
187. Sabel & Simon, supra note 156, at 1027.
188. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (2000) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Goals 2000].
189. For a full discussion of the Goals 2000 legislation, see Michael Heise, Goals 2000:
Educate America Act: The Federalizationand Legalization of Education Policy, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 345 (1994).

190. For a brief description of two states' efforts, see Michael Heise, The Courts, Educational
Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 633, 636-41 (2002)
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Goals 2000, however, was only the beginning of the federal
government's newly-discovered taste for general elementary and
secondary education policy. The second part of what some states
believe amounts to a "one-two punch" is the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001 ("NCLBA").191 Supported by an overwhelming majority in
Congress and signed into law by President Bush in 2002, the NCLBA
is remarkable for its ambition and intrusion into what was once
considered a traditional state and local domain. 192 The NCLBA
193
revises the Elementary and Secondary Education Act ("ESEA"),
first enacted in 1965 and reauthorized periodically ever since. 194 The
most important and well-known component of the ESEA, Title I, is the
federal government's single largest aid program and ostensibly seeks
In exchange for this federal
to assist disadvantaged students.
funding, which all states receive, states and local school districts must
comply with various federal education requirements.
Under the NCLBA, states are now obligated to develop and
implement "challenging" academic content and performance standards
in reading, math, and science. 195 States must now also implement
assessments, aligned with their academic standards, to measure
student and school performance. 196 Finally, accountability measures
must reveal whether schools are making adequate yearly progress in
19 7
bringing all students to a level of proficiency within twelve years.
The NCLBA requires adequate yearly progress reports from all public
school districts, regardless of whether they receive federal Title I
funds. 198 These requirements now include a robust testing regime
with accountability measures that can trigger substantive
(describing New York's and North Carolina's development of education standards and
assessments).
191. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) [hereinafter NCLBA].
192. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Thousands of Schools May Run Afoul of New Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2003, at A33 (quoting Paul Houston, executive director of the American Association of
School Administrators, who called the law "the largest federal intrusion into the educational
affairs of the states in the history of this country"). For a description of the bipartisan
congressional support for the NCLBA, see Dan Seligman, Children Will Be Left Behind, FORBES,
Mar. 15, 2004, at 86.
193. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
194. Prior to the NCLBA, the most recent reauthorization of Title I occurred in 1994. See
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IASA].
195. NCLBA, § 1111(b)(1)(A), (C).
196. NCLBA, § 1111(b)(3), 1116.
197. NCLBA, § 1111(b)(2)(C), (F).
198. Districts receiving Title I funding are held to stricter accountability mechanisms. See
NCLBA, § llll(b)(1)(A), (b)(5), (b)(7), (b)(8).
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consequences, ultimately leading to a state takeover of any school that
fails to make adequate progress after five consecutive years.1 99
Although some commentators praise and others criticize this new
federal foray into educational policymaking terrain, few dispute that
the new federal legislation reflects a clear orientation on outcomes
20 0
rather than inputs.
One of the NCLBA's key strategic elements is that it leverages
a state's own standards and assessment program. That is, the
NCLBA functionally holds states to educational standards that they
have articulated for themselves.
This element, while politically
shrewd, is not without cost, however. By leveraging a state's own
standards as the trigger for the imposition of federally-imposed
consequences for a district's failure to achieve NCLBA transforms a
potential reform asset-state efforts to monitor student and school
performance-into a potential liability. 2 1 State test scores that might
have been used by a state to its advantage now amount to a potential
liability in that they trigger under the NCLBA a single judgment
regarding yearly progress: success or failure. 20 2 States must affix a
failing label to every school that does not succeed. This label will
likely become a chief proxy for school quality, one that will be difficult
to rebut. 20 3 As educators readily understand: "It's going to take a lot
of explaining," if and when large numbers of schools fail to make
adequate yearly progress under the NCLBA. 20 4
Indeed, not
surprisingly, many states confronting new federal consequences
flowing from failing to meet their own standards have begun to dilute

199. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. See also Paul T. O'Neill, High States Testing Law and
Litigation, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 623, 633 (2003) (describing various statutory requirements
imposed by NCLBA).
200. See e.g., Heise, supra note 189 (describing Goals 2000); James S. Liebman & Charles F.
Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81
N.C.L. REV. 1703 (2003) (describing the No Child Left Behind Act).
201. For a general critique of the NCLBA, see James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the
No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2004).
202. See, e.g., June Kronholtz, Education Plan Falling Short: States Struggle to Mect
Standardsof No Child Left Behind, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2003, at A4.
203. See Lynn Olson, All States Get Federal Nod on Key Plans, EDUC. WK., June 18, 2003, at
1, 20 (reporting that Virginia's chairman of the state board of education agreed to comply with
the federal law "only under strong protest," expressing concern that schools given the highest
rating under the state accountability system might nonetheless "be viewed as 'failing' in some
respect under the federal law").
204. Id. at 21 (quoting Michael Ward, North Carolina's education superintendent). Ward
also admitted that one of the North Carolina's "most intensive efforts has been around a
communication plan," presumably to provide an explanation that will placate parents and others
concerned by schools' failure to make AYP. Id.
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state standards rather than risk public censure and federal
205
sanctions.
The idea behind identifying high- and low-performing schools
under accountability systems is to assist school officials' efforts to
improve them. The welcome goal, and a rationally-related means to
that goal, combine to generate a defensible, perhaps attractive policy.
Such an accountability system, however, can generate alternative
consequences as well-some of which may undermine school
integration efforts. Classifying schools as high- and low-achieving on
the basis of standardized tests will inevitably and quickly become the
principal prism through which people form impressions about school
quality 20 6 and thereby threatens to crowd out other plausible proxies
for quality. 20 7 Identifying schools as underperforming might induce
impatient parents, who are unwilling to wait for the unpredictable
fruits of a school remediation plan or reform measure, and who
possess the economic ability, to depart districts served by failing
schools. To the extent that such parents are more likely to be white,
wealthy, or both, standards-based accountability systems provide
more impetus toward neighborhood-and thus public schoolstratification.
Indeed, researchers have already begun to detect evidence of
standardized testing's adverse influence on the resegregation of
integrated high schools. 208 They note how parents of children in these
schools have become more skeptical of the value of integration in light
of the schools' decline in performance on standardized tests.20 9 Their
findings suggest that middle-class households will tolerate school
integration, but only so long as it does not adversely impact test
performance. 210
As a result, well-regarded integrated schools,

205. See Sam Dillon, States are Relaxing Education Standards to Avoid Sanctions from
Federal Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at A29; Peter Schrag, Bush's Education Fraud, AM.
PROSPECT, Feb. 2004, at 38, 40.
206. See infra Part IV.B.3.
207. Amy Stuart Wells & Jennifer Jellison Holme, No Accountability for Diversity:
Standardized Tests and the Demise of Racially Mixed Schools (Aug. 30, 2002) (unpublished
paper, on file with author) at 10 ("Overall, we see a trend in our data from school reputations
based on a broad array of factors - i.e., athletics, theater, band, curriculum, diversity, national
merit scholars, college acceptance of graduates, and student diversity - to much more narrowly
defined reputations, based much more heavily on standardized test scores.").
208. See John C. Boger, Education's 'Perfect Storm"? Racial Resegregation, High Stakes
Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina,81 N.C. L. REV. 1375, 144142 (2003) (noting standards and assessments' adverse impact on school integration in North
Carolina); Wells & Holme, supra note 207 (studying the effects of standardized test results on
the racial composition of six integrated public high schools).
209. Wells & Holme, supranote 207, at 1.
210. See generally id.
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including some in Table 2, have lost or are in the process of losing
white students, as well as many middle-class African-American and
Hispanic students. 2 11 Whereas these integrated schools were once
valued based on an array of criteria, schools are now increasingly
judged on test scores alone.
B. Implications for Future Equal Educational Opportunity Litigation:
Litigated Learning?

On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown decision, a
new generation of policymakers (and future litigants) prepares to
launch a new line of litigation that seeks to equalize student academic
achievement. Litigants will soon ask the very courts that proved
unable to integrate the schools or equalize school spending to shoulder
the even more arduous goal of enhancing equal education by
equalizing student educational outcomes. And to an even greater
degree than for school desegregation or finance, courts and lawsuits
seem ill-equipped to shoulder this task.
The next generation of education reform litigation will confront
important challenges that flow from a relatively new focus on
standards and assessments. The three main challenges to achieving
success arise from the inherent complexities surrounding student
achievement, the location of critical variables deep inside the
classroom, and suburbanites' educational interests.
1. Education's Black Box: Student Achievement
Student academic achievement remains notoriously difficult to
understand. Although achievement differences between and among
students are manifestly clear, answers to such questions as what
variables systematically influence student achievement and why
differences emerge elude. These questions persist not for want of
study, however. As previously discussed, debates about American
212
student achievement appear ceaseless.
Although most concede that the precise determinants of
student academic achievement might never be fully understood, a few
broad themes have survived the test of time in the research
literatures.
Professor James Coleman's seminal work rightfully

211. See Wells & Holme, supra note 207, at 13.
212. See supra Part III.B.3.
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anchors discussions about student achievement. 2 13 A review of
Coleman's work reveals two pivotal yet seemingly conflicting themes.
First, Coleman noted that peer (or socioeconomic) effects are more
important than school spending. 2 14 Second, institutions (such as
certain schools) that generate social capital can also enhance student
achievement. 215 The two themes appear at one level to run in opposite
directions: peer effects emphasize variables outside of schools, and
institutional effects emphasize schools themselves. At another level,
however, the two themes harmonize. That is, certain types of schools
have the ability to generate positive peer interactions.
Notwithstanding the emergence of general themes, much about
what variables influence student achievement remains unknown.
Such uncertainty makes it difficult for policymakers to raise student
achievement. What is difficult for policymakers is even more difficult
for litigators seeking to generate policy outcomes through the courts.
2.

From Outside to Inside the Classroom

Changes in how equal educational opportunity is construed
implicate the focus of related litigation efforts. Past reform and
litigation efforts seeking to enhance equal educational opportunity
focused on such variables as race and finance. Both variables are
located outside the classroom. Reform and litigation efforts, however,
increasingly focus on such variables as academic standards and
assessments. These factors are located inside the classroom, attend
more directly to learning processes, and implicate teaching and
curriculum practices and policy. On the one hand, such variables are
more likely to influence the desired outcome of increased student
achievement. On the other hand, because these variables go to the
core of delicate relations between teachers, students, and parents,
these variables are much less amenable to deft manipulation by the
blunt instrument of litigation.
In the service of education, the many intersections involving
students, teachers, and parents play critical roles.
Given the
sometimes complementary and sometimes competing individual and
213. For an insightful essay synthesizing Coleman's research, see Richard D. Kahlenberg,
LearningFrom James Coleman, 144 PUB. INT. 54 (2001).

214. See generally COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that "[i]t appears that
variation in the facilities and curriculums of the schools account for relatively little variation in
pupil achievement," whereas "it appears that a pupil's achievement is strongly related to the
educational background and aspirations of the other students in the school").
215. See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN

ET AL.,

HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC,

CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982) (noting the comparative advantages enjoyed
by private Catholic schools).

HeinOnline -- 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2457 2004

2458

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:6:2417

institutional incentives, what frequently arises is a delicate balance
that, with any luck, will yield desired student achievement. This
delicate balance is fraught with nuances and is frequently highly
individualistic. While this balance of interests certainly responds to
policy pushes and pulls, to think that it can be guided through the
litigation process and court decisions is naive, at best.
School desegregation supplies a helpful analogy. Even if it was
the case that litigation could increase school integration levels,
increased racial understanding-part of Brown's promise-does not
necessarily follow. While perhaps integration is a necessary predicate
to increased racial understanding, an increase in the former does not
guarantee an increase in the latter. That is, the most one can
rightfully expect from litigation is to increase integration levels. As
previously discussed, it is unclear whether litigation can achieve even
that. Consequently, it is far too much to ask for any legal institution
to deliver the more important-yet subtle-increases in racial
understanding and tolerance. Those outcomes, however desirable, are
the product of a host of complicated factors that fall far outside of the
reach of litigation and law.
3. Suburban Opposition
Increasingly important, though often ignored, stakeholders in
many education reform efforts are suburbanites, particularly
suburban parents. 2 16 Received wisdom suggests that suburban school
districts should either support or at least not resist the new focus on
student and school outcomes. After all, higher performing students
and school districts are more likely found in suburban areas. 2 17
Consequently, suburban parents are generally satisfied with the
public schools they support and their children attend. 21 8 This general
satisfaction, in turn, helps fuel and buoy favorable suburban property
21 9
values.
Efforts-through litigation or legislation-by those seeking to
enhance education equity involving implementing robust standards
and assessment regimes can expect some degree of opposition from
many suburbanites.
Test-based
standards
and
assessment

216. The argument in this subpart is a further refinement of an argument articulated in
Ryan & Heise, supra note 83, passim.
217. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 83, at 2106 & n.331.
218. TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 34-35 (2001).

219. See, e.g., Sandra E. Black, Do Better Schools Matter? ParentalValuation of Elementary
Education, 114 Q.J. ECON. 577, 578 (1999) (noting correlation between student test scores and
district residential home values).
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accountability regimes can pose something of a threat to the status
quo for some suburban school districts. Many suburban districts fear
that the inevitable pull of standardized tests will lead to increased
"dumbing down" in the curriculum and standardization in academic
offerings. 220 Many desirable suburban school districts are justifiably
proud of their rich curricula. The more esoteric elements of an
advanced curriculum might give way to a defensive posture reflecting
a desire to ensure strong test results.
Some districts might
understandably and prudently devote additional class time to statemandated test material at the expense of advanced creative writing or
a class in Shakespeare's tragedies. 221 As a consequence, the interests
of the district as a whole and specific subsets of students might depart
more sharply.
A second, related source of suburban opposition involves the
emerging consequences of recent state and federal education
legislation. Suburban school districts that presently benefit from
desirable reputations might resist any new testing system that
threatens to tarnish their academic reputation. The tarnish flows
from the combination of two factors. First, there is an emerging push
for accountability. Second, there is an increased call for the public
dissemination of assessment results in a form that fuels comparisons
among schools within a district, as well as across districts. Even the
potential for a conflict between new standardized test results and
existing expectations will generate great concern among suburban
parents and homeowners. For many, the price might be too high,
especially in light of the substantial investment many suburban
communities make in their public schools. This group will surely
demand to know why their local schools, which they believed to be of
high quality and are crucial to local property values, fail to perform as
222
expected.
Evidence from Florida's test-based school accountability system
illustrates these fears. Florida grades its public schools and assigns a
letter grade (A through F) on the basis of test scores. 2 23 Economists
have noted that even slight distinctions between school grades
224
translated into consequential fluctuations in home values.

220. See, e.g., James Traub, The Test Mess, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 7, 2002, at 46.
221. This was part of the concern raised in Scarsdale, New York. Id. at 51.
222. See David N. Figlio & Maurice E. Lucas, What's in a Grade? School Report Cards and
the Housing Market, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 591 (2004). (while controlling for other measures of
school quality, as well as for neighborhood and property attributes, providing data, although
inconclusive, that the impact may be temporary).
223. See Ryan, supra note 201.
224. See generally Figlio & Lucas, supra note 222, at 595-600, 599 tbl.2.
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If Florida's example is even remotely illustrative, the stakes to
suburbanites posed by standards and assessments are considerable.
Setting aside the likely discomfort that would inexorably flow from a
revelation that suburban schoolchildren might not be as "advanced" as
conventional wisdom implies, significant economic consequences
might befall suburban America as well. One asset highly exposed to
education reform, discomforting to suburban schools, is suburban
housing values. In many areas, suburban home values are tightly
bound to the perceived or real performance of suburban schools. 225
Only after realizing that for middle-class Americans equity in their
homes represents their most significant financial asset can one begin
226
to fully grasp the enormity of the economic interest at stake.
Another critical aspect of suburbanites' role in education reform is
that when they "perceive a threat" to their interests-especially their
public schools-they fight back, and they usually win." 22 7 To the
extent that future education reform battles will implicate suburban
interests and place their interests in perceived or real jeopardy, there
is little or no reason to think that suburbs' success rate at selfprotection will not continue.
V. CONCLUSION
The legendary (and ongoing) difficulties incident to an effort to
influence the demographic composition of public schools pale in
comparison to the difficulties that will be encountered as litigants
seek to influence student academic achievement through litigation. If
the reach of the courts was stretched in the school desegregation and
finance contexts, it will hit a frustrating "wall" quickly as such
litigation seeks squarely to address student achievement through
standards- and assessments-based lawsuits. This is so because,
compared to school demographic and spending profiles, student
academic achievement is exceptionally complex and involves a host of
variables that fall far outside of courts' province. Even if such
variables were within courts' reach, reformers that press litigation
into service are deploying a blunt instrument into terrain noted for its
need for nuance and subtlety.
That litigation possesses structural limitations that restrict its
ability to achieve desired social change is surely no reason to ignore
225. See FISCHEL, supranote 110, at 1-18; Black, supra note 219, at 577-78.
226. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 8, 16 (1995) ("Home ownership is without question the

single most important means of accumulating assets.").
227. Ryan & Heise, supra note 83, at 2046. For a full explication of this thesis, see id.
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the need for education reform or to relinquish the quest for greater
educational opportunity. Brown achieved the seminal goal of calling
attention to education's crucial role in our society and constitutional
structure. Greater understanding of education's critical roles made
the need for greater equity in the distribution of educational resources
more compelling. Moreover, although the courts play a role in
enhancing equal educational opportunity-indeed, perhaps, a critical
role-courts must join other complementary social, economic, and
political institutions and actors to realize the desired social change.
Efforts to reform something as complicated as education that fail to
see how the courts need to work in consort with other critical
institutions are guilty of either hubris, naivete, or both. More
important, such efforts are doomed to fail.
Just as the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown decision calls for
an appropriate celebration of what law can achieve-especially in the
education field-it is an equally appropriate moment to consider what
law cannot achieve. Recognizing the law's limitations in this context
does not diminish Brown's legacy. If anything, a deeper and fuller
understanding of what law can and cannot achieve and law's role
within a broader institutional context will enhance reformers' efforts
at making the equal educational opportunity doctrine come alive.
Such a result fully comports with Brown's legacy.
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